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In a typical premises liability lawsuit–such as a “slip-and-fall” case–the plaintiff must prove the property owner had “actual or constructive” knowledge of a hazardous condition on the property. But the property owner may attempt to defend itself by showing the plaintiff had “equal knowledge” of the hazard. If the plaintiff failed to exercise “ordinary care,” then the property owner won’t be held liable.

A recent Georgia Court of Appeals decision illustrates these principles. In Houston v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., the plaintiff was shopping early one morning at a Wal-Mart in Clayton County. The plaintiff pushed a shopping car through the store’s meat department. He walked over some flattened cardboard boxes left on the floor by an employee. When he turned the cart around and walked over those same boxes a second time, he slipped on the boxes and fell to the ground.

The plaintiff sued Wal-Mart and two of its employees for damages related to injuries he suffered in the fall. During discovery, Wal-Mart produced security camera footage showing the plaintiff had crossed the cardboard boxes once without incident before falling the second time. The plaintiff conceded this point in his own deposition. Based on this, the trial judge concluded the plaintiff had “equal knowledge” of the hazard posed by the cardboard boxes and granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart and the two employees. The plaintiff appealed.

Personal injury cases are usually tried in state courts under state law. But when the plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states–say, an individual plaintiff living in Georgia sues a company based in Florida–then the case may be removed to a federal court. The federal court must still decide the case based on state law. But federal rules govern procedural questions like the admission of evidence. This can sometimes lead to confusion, as the Eleventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in Atlanta recently found.

Cooper v. Marten Transport, Ltd.

In 2010, a husband and wife suffered serious back injuries after a tractor trailer collided with their car in Georgia. The couple sued the other driver and the company that owned the tractor trailer. As the defendants were not Georgia residents, they had the case removed from state to federal court.

Grade-crossing collisions–accidents where trains hit vehicles–are a surprisingly common occurrence in the U.S. railroad industry. Norfolk Southern, one of the largest railroads on the east coast, reported approximately 2,500 grade-crossing collisions over a four-year period–more than one accident per day. Railroad employees are frequently injured in these collisions, and unlike automobile-only accidents, their ability to recover damages may depend on federal, rather than state, law.

The Georgia Supreme Court recently addressed one such case. The plaintiff was a Norfolk Southern conductor. In 2007, the conductor’s train hit a logging truck in Dodge County. The conductor suffered severe back injuries and has not returned to work for the past six years.

The conductor sued Norfolk Southern alleging negligence. He claimed the company failed to train him properly “on how to protect himself in the event of a grade-crossing collision.” The conductor produced three experts, including a former Norfolk Southern trainmaster, who offered evidence tying the conductor’s injuries to a lack of proper training.

The “Ramblin’ Wreck” is well known to students and football fans at Georgia Tech. Since 1961, the Wreck–an authentic 1930 Ford Model A–has led the Tech football team into home games at Bobby Dodd Stadium in Atlanta. The Wreck is owned by the university but supervised by a student group called the “Ramblin’ Wreck Club.” The club elects a driver annually who is then responsible for the Wreck’s day-to-day operation and maintenance.

In 2007, about three months before the start of the football season, the Wreck’s driver was transporting the vehicle via trailer to a non-university event in Savannah. The accident severely damaged the Wreck. Several companies volunteered their services to repair the Wreck in time for the season, including Eco-Clean, Inc., which refurbished the car’s interior and roof.

Two years later, the Wreck’s driver and three other club members took the car from its garage to a nearby fraternity house. During the return trip, one member “stood on the passenger side running board, grasping an interior handle with one hand and an exterior handle with the other,” which was a standard position taken by club members when riding the vehicle. Unfortunately, one of the handles broke off, throwing the student from the vehicle. He suffered significant head injuries and permanently lost his sense of taste and smell as well as partial hearing.

In a personal injury lawsuit, it’s critical to establish all of your facts before proceeding to court. It’s not enough to simply accuse someone of causing you an injury. There must be sufficient facts alleged to connect the injury to some action–or inaction–by the defendant. If a plaintiff can’t present such facts, the trial court will grant summary judgment to the defendant.

A recent decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals, Taylor v. Thunderbird Lanes, LLC, provides a useful example. In this case, the plaintiff was a woman who went to a local bowling alley with her son and daughter-in-law. The plaintiff was an experienced bowler who had patronized the alley before.

Bowling alleys commonly treat their lanes with oil in order to aid ball movement. Typically, such oil is used beyond the “foul line” behind which the bowler is expected to release his or her ball. There should be no oil or other obstruction in the area approaching the foul line.

When you go to a hospital for treatment, is the hospital liable if something goes wrong? Not necessarily. Many of the physicians who work at a hospital are not employees, but rather “independent contractors” with medical privileges. Georgia law allows hospitals to escape liability for the medical malpractice of these independent contractor physicians if certain conditions are met.

A recent decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals helps illustrate the problem. The victim in this case had a “previous cardiac history” and was admitted to Emory-Adventist Hospital on New Year’s Eve of 2005. He complained of “chest pain, shortness of breath, and urinary difficulties.” The attending physician in the emergency department treated him. Two days later, however, the victim died of a heart attack.

Two years later, the victim’s widow sued the hospital, the attending physician and several other parties. The hospital argued it was not a proper party to the lawsuit because the attending physician was an independent contractor, not a hospital employee. In fact, the attending physician worked for Cobb Medical Associates, LLC.

Bad Boy Enterprises manufactures and sells golf carts modified to function as off-road vehicles. These “Bad Boy Buggies” are primarily marketed to outdoor enthusiasts and hunters. They are also the subject of an ongoing federal lawsuit in Georgia over their safety.

The plaintiffs in this case are the parents of a minor. The child was 13 years old when her parents allowed her to operate a Bad Boy Buggy owned by a family friend. The child had driven the vehicle on several prior occasions, always with her parents permission. On the day in question, she was driving the buggy around a looping gravel driveway with a friend sitting in the passenger seat.

According to court records, the buggy would suddenly accelerate even when constant pressure was maintained on the accelerator pedal. On this particular day, the child applied the brake as the vehicle entered a turn. The vehicle continued to accelerate, however, and eventually tipped over, severing the child’s left foot and part of her leg.

Is a restaurant liable when a customer is stabbed on its property? The Georgia Court of Appeals recently addressed this question and answered with a resounding “no.” A three-judge panel upheld a trial court’s decision awarding summary judgment to the restaurant.

The incident took place back in 2010. The victim was having dinner with his girlfriend and her family at a Mexican restaurant in Paulding County. At a nearby table, another customer–who had “consumed an unknown quantity of alcoholic beverages,” according to court records–began verbally harassing the group. The restaurant manager agreed to move the victim’s party to another table, but he declined to eject the drunken customer and, in fact, continued to serve him alcohol.

The customer continued to harass the victim’s group, at one point threatening a toddler. At this point, the restaurant manager asked the customer to leave. The manager later testified he was “a little afraid” of the customer but did not consider him an immediate threat to anyone in the restaurant.

In personal injury cases, trial juries are expected to employ their common sense and knowledge in determining liability. Expert testimony may provide a jury with specialized knowledge, but, as the Georgia Supreme Court has said in Cower v Widener, most “simple negligence” cases such testimony is not required “to establish a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.” Recently, the Georgia Court of Appeals applied this principle to a dispute between an accident victim and his insurance company.

In February 2002, the victim was waiting in his car at an intersection. An unknown driver rear-ended him. The victim’s head slammed against the window. The victim exited his vehicle in a “dazed” state and proceeded to speak briefly with the other driver. However, before the victim could obtain any further vehicle or insurance information, the other driver fled the scene.

Shortly thereafter, the victim started receiving chiropractic treatment for lower back pain. Nine months later, an MRI revealed a herniated disk. The radiologist supervising the MRI concluded the injury was “possibly several months of age,” putting it within the time frame of the February accident.

Sometimes even judges get confused about basic traffic laws. In June, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict after finding the judge improperly instructed jurors about the law governing the right-of-way at a four-way stop sign. The case arose from a traffic accident in Gwinnett County where each driver blamed the other.

The plaintiff in this case testified that he arrived at the intersection–which had a four-way stop sign–first, stopped, and then proceeded to execute a left-hand turn. The defendant’s truck, approaching from the cross-road, failed to yield the stop sign and collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle in the intersection. The defendant, in contrast, said he arrived at the intersection a few seconds before the plaintiff and in fact made a complete stop before entering the intersection.

The police officer who took the accident report said the defendant was at fault for the accident, because “by state law when you both stop at the same time, you have to yield to the vehicle to your right.” At trial, however, the judge said this was wrong. Instead, the judge charged the jury as follows:

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